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INTRODUCTION

The extradition of Israeli citizens to the United States has been very
problematic in the last twenty years. Since 1978, when Israel amended
its Extradition Law prohibiting the extradition of its citizens, it has stood
in breach of its explicit international obligation towards the United
States to extradite its citizens. This conflict recently reached a zenith
when Israel refused to extradite Samuel Sheinbein, a citizen of both
Israel and the United States, whose extradition was requested for his
commission of a first degree murder in Maryland.
This case accelerated a very recent amendment to the Israeli
Extradition Law regarding the extradition of citizens. The amendment
provides that Israeli citizens who are also residents of Israel will be
extradited solely to stand trial in the requesting state and on condition
that, if they so wish, they will be returned to Israel to serve a custodial
sentence imposed upon them. As the United States and Israel have not
yet amended their extradition treaty, the treaty provision preventing
either party from imposing restrictions on the extradition of citizens
from Israel to the United States and vice versa remains in force, and thus
creates a conflict with Israel's domestic law.
This article will address the problems of extraditing Israeli citizens
to the United States from both a normative and substantive perspective.
The analysis will lead to a conclusion that the United States and Israel
should adopt an amendment to the United States-Israel extradition treaty
based on the new provision of the Israeli law regarding the extradition of
its citizens. This analysis will also support general conclusions regarding
the definitions of extradition and citizenship.

I. THE NORMATIVE PROBLEM
A. The Status of Extradition Treaties Within the Domestic
Legal Systems of the United States and Israel
Extradition is the process by which a person, charged with or convicted of a crime under the laws of one state, is arrested in another state
and returned for trial and/or punishment to the state where he was
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The Problem with Scorecards

terrorism, control of drug trafficking, nuclear non-proliferation, respect
for human rights, environmental protection, etc.
What is the role of quantitative "scorecards" in this process? The answer will depend on whether future scholars can find ways to fix the
many methodological problems that beset the scorecard approach. It
seems clear that a great deal of ingenuity and econometric skill will be
required to overcome the formidable challenges that sanctions "games"
present to those who would make use of quantitative analysis to study
such games. Meanwhile, policy-makers will be well advised to continue
to rely on old-fashioned heuristic judgment informed, perhaps, by
something like the case method with which lawyers are familiar: examining future cases from the perspective of the deepest possible
understanding of past cases, searching for experiential precedents in the
way that lawyers and judges seek legal precedents, relying frankly on
intuition and judgement to account for the inevitable dissimilarities and
gaps in data that remain after the storehouse of known history is exhausted.

CONCLUSION

Sanctions continue to occupy an important middle ground between
jawboning and war. The importance of getting sanctions right is well
worth the effort of a more vigorous inquiry.
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charged or convicted.' According to prevailing customary international
law, a requested state has no duty to extradite persons to stand trial or
undergo punishment in a requesting state.2 Any obligation to surrender
persons who have committed crimes in foreign countries is based on the
existence of a treaty between the requesting and the requested states
Most extradition agreements between states are bilateral treaties.4 Israel
and the United States signed a bilateral extradition treaty on December
10, 1962, which entered into force a year later on December 5, 1963. 5
Extradition treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, are part of
public international law.6 However, they have a unique character since
they are implemented solely by a state's domestic organs, rather than by
international institutions. Domestic judicial and executive branches of
the requesting and requested states must decide whether to request the
extradition of a fugitive from justice and whether to grant it.8 Thus, extradition treaties are meaningless unless part of a state's domestic legal
system.
United States federal legislation regulates the extradition of offenders who committed crimes in foreign countries and are now in the United
States. 9 This legislation states explicitly that "[t]he provisions of this
chapter relating to the surrender of persons who have committed crimes
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 475 and introductory
note, at 556-557 (1986); see also, e.g., Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902); Draft
Convention on Extradition,29 AM. J. INT'L L. 66 (Supp. 1935).
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 475 cmt. a.; see also
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 482 (4th ed. 1997).
3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 475 cmt. b.; see also,
e.g., I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-24, 27 (1971); 1 OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW pt. 2 at 950 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992).
4. See Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS AND VALUES, 250 (1995). Bilateral treaties are the most common forms of extradition arrangement but there are also
regional conventions. See, e.g., European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, 359
U.N.T.S. 273; Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, Oct. 15, 1975,
Europ. T.S. No. 86; Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition,
Mar. 17, 1978, Europ. T.S. No. 98; Convention on Extradition, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3111.
There is no universal treaty on extradition but the United Nations General Assembly has produced the Model Treaty on Extradition, 30 I.L.M. 1407 1991, which has formed the basis of
inter-state extradition agreements.
5. Convention on Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, U.S.-Isr., 14 U.S.T. 1707 (amended Apr.
11, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 382).
6. See GEOFF GILBERT, TRANSNATIONAL FUGITIVE OFFENDERS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW

14 (1998).

7. See id. at 2, 15-16.
8. The procedure for requesting and granting extradition varies from one state to the
other. See id. at 70-74, 78-84.
9. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1994) (sections address extradition, particularly
§§ 3181, 3184).
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in foreign countries shall continue in force only during the existence of
any treaty of extradition with such foreign government",' ° meaning that
the United States may only implement the procedure provided by Congress" if the requesting country has ratified an extradition treaty with the
United States.
United States courts have held that an extradition treaty is selfexecuting, and that a fugitive may be arrested and extradited under the
terms of the agreement alone, without the aid of implementing legislation." In such a case, the Federal Law on Extradition serves only as a
model code of extradition, and the process actually takes place according
to the treaty.
In Israel, treaties do not become part of domestic law by virtue of
their ratification, even if by their nature they are self-executing. Rather,
treaties become part of Israeli law by a separate act of legislation.' 3 Some
treaties are ratified without any further incorporation, in which case they
are not considered part of Israeli domestic law, and are not implemented
by its domestic courts.' 4 Some treaties are followed by incorporating
legislation enacted after the ratification of a treaty, and so become part
of Israel's domestic law. 5 In certain cases, the legislature enacts a law
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3181.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
12. See In re Metzger, 46 U.S. 176, 188 (1847); Valentine v. U.S. 299 U.S. 5, 10, 18
(1936).
13. This rule was first expressed in C.A. 25/55, The Custodian of Absentee Property v.
Samara, 10 P.D. 1829. The rule has since been affirmed in a number of cases. See, e.g., C.A.
43/76, Kupath Holim Maccabi v. State of Israel, 31(1) P.D. 770, 777; H.C. 698/80, Kawasma
v. Minister of Defence, 35(1) P.D. 617, 627; H.C. 393/82, Jamait Askan v. Commander of
IDF in the Judea and Samaria Region, 37(4) P.D. 785, 793.
14. The Four 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War were ratified
by Israel on July 6, 1951. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and the Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of the Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Treatment of Prisoners of
War, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Israel never incorporated these conventions into its
domestic legal system. When petitions were submitted to the Supreme Court sitting as the
High Court of Justice against the orders of the military governor in Judea, Samaria and Gaza
for violations of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, the High Court always ruled that this Convention was entirely customary international law. The Court went on to rule that since it was not enacted into
domestic law, it did not have force in Israel's domestic legal system and could not serve as
grounds for voiding the governor's orders. See, e.g., H.C. 606/78, Ayub et al. v. Minister of
Defence et al., 33(2) P.D. 113, 120-123, 125-129; Kawasama, 35(l) P.D. at 617, 627, 636;
JamaitAskan, 37(4) P.D. at 793.
15. See, e.g., the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (ratified by Israel on Mar. 9, 1950). The treaty was
followed by the Israeli Law Concerning the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1950, 4 L.S.1 101 (1949-1950).
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that can be implemented by the courts pending the existence of a treaty.
Such a law also serves as a tool for the incorporation of the treaties. Extradition falls into this last category.
Section 2 of the Israeli Extradition Law 16 states that "[a] person may
be extradited if ...an agreement providing for reciprocity as to the extradition of offenders exists between Israel and the state requesting his
extradition." This provision's dual effect is that Israel cannot extradite
someone to a requesting state without the existence of a treaty, and
automatically incorporates extradition treaties that Israel concludes into
its domestic legal system.
Section 1 of the Extradition Law complicates the legal situation regarding extradition in Israeli law, which provides that "[a] person who is
in Israel shall not be extradited to another state except under this law." 17
In contrast to the United States, where the Federal Law on Extradition
serves only as a model code conferring priority in domestic law to any
treaty arrangements, in Israel the extradition treaty will be part of domestic law as long as it does not contradict the provisions of the
Extradition Law. In cases of a conflict between any extradition treaty
ratified by Israel and Israeli domestic extradition law, the domestic law
will prevail.
B. The Conflict Between Treaty Obligationsand Domestic Law
Regarding the Extraditionof Israeli Citizens to the United States
The Israeli legislature, the Knesset, already considered whether to
extradite Israeli citizens to stand trial or undergo punishment in a foreign
country upon the enactment of the original Israeli Extradition Law in
1954. The then-Minister of Justice, Pinchas Rosen, strongly objected to
the insertion of a clause prohibiting the extradition of Israeli citizens to a
foreign county,' 8 although there were dissenting views.' 9 Finally, the
1954 Extradition Law did not include any provision regarding the extradition of Israeli citizens. The courts interpreted the law's silence on that
point as allowing the extradition of Israeli citizens, even in cases where
the requesting country would not extradite its own citizens to Israel.2 °
In accordance with this domestic legal situation established in 1954,
Article IV of the 1962 Convention Relating to Extradition between
Israel and the United States provided that "[a] requested Party shall not
decline to extradite a person sought because such person is a national of
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Extradition Law, 1954, 8 L.S.I. 144 (1953-1954).
8 L.S.I. 144
See D.K. (1953) 2035, at 2036-37.
See D.K. (1953) 2035, at 2039-40, 2041-42, 2045-46.
See, e.g., C.A 308/75 Pesachovich v. The State of Israel, 31(2) P.D. 449 (1977).

MichiganJournalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 21:297

the requesting Party."2' This provision became part of Israeli domestic
law, since it did not conflict with any other section of the Israeli Extradition Law.22 It also became part of United States domestic law23 and fit
into the general policy of the United States to extradite both aliens and
citizens when all other requirements for extradition were met.2'
Israel's position changed and became more complex in 1978 when it
decided to amend its Extradition Law. The amendment was initiated in
1977 by Menachem Begin, then head of the Knesset opposition party
and later elected Prime Minister in 1977. He suggested that the Extradition Law be amended to prohibit the extradition of Israeli citizens to a
foreign country."

His proposal was debated in the Knesset 26 and finally became law on
January 3, 1978.27 According to the amendment, "[a]n Israeli national
shall not be extradited save for an offence committed before he became
an Israeli national. 28 The amendment also provided that "the courts in
Israel are competent to try under Israeli law an Israeli national or resident of Israel who committed abroad an act which had it been committed
in Israel, would be one of the offences included in the Schedule to the
Extradition Law, 1954. ,29
This amendment created a very grave problem from a normative
perspective; this article will analyze its substantive aspects in greater
detail.3 ° According to the amendment, Israel was prohibited from extraditing its citizens, and this new provision of domestic law prevailed over
any international obligation which provided for the contrary.3 In the
21. Convention on Extradition, supra note 5, 14 U.S.T. at 1710. Since the Israeli Extradition Law was silent on the issue of extraditing Israeli citizens, Israel could also ratify
arrangements that differed from its arrangement with the United States with regard to the

extradition of citizens from Israel. For example, Article 6(1)(a) of the European Convention
on Extradition, to which Israel is a party, provides that "[a] Contracting Party shall have the
right to refuse extradition of its nationals." European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13,
1957, art. 6(l)(a), 359 U.N.T.S. 273, 280.
22. Supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
23. Supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
24. See SHEARER, supra note 3, at 110.
25. See D.K. (1977), 1452-53.
26. See D.K. (1978), 1032-36.
27. See Offences Committed Abroad (Amendment of Enactments) Law, 1978, 32 L.S.I.
63 (1976-1979).
28. 32 L.S.I. 63. This amendment became Section IA of the Israeli 1954 Extradition
Law.
29. See 32 L.S.I 63. This provision became Section 4A of the Penal Law (Offences
Committed Abroad) (Consolidated Version) 1973 27 L.S.I. 32 (1970-1973). Today this pro-

vision appears with certain changes in Section 15 of the Israel Penal Law due to Amendment
No. 39 of the Israeli Penal Law, 1994, S. H. 1481.
30. See infra chapter III.

31. See Extradition Law, 1954, 8 L.S.I. 144 (1953-1954).
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conflict between the United States-Israel Extradition Treaty, which
obliged the parties to extradite their nationals, and the 1978 amendment
to the Israeli Extradition Law prohibiting the extradition of Israeli citizens to any foreign country (including the United States), the Extradition
Law prevailed. Israeli courts had to ignore a request of the United States
to extradite Israeli citizens to stand for trial or punishment in the United
States, which caused Israel to breach its Extradition Treaty with the
United States 2
C. How May the Conflict Be Solved?
1. Introduction
The conflict between Israel's domestic and international legal obligations regarding the extradition of citizens may be solved in two
different ways. If one believes that the ideal law would not enable Israel
to extradite its citizens, then the parties must amend the United StatesIsrael extradition treaty. However, if one believes that Israel should be
able to extradite its citizens, then Israel must amend its Extradition Law.
The ideal law should be shaped by both normative and substantive
considerations. This article will first address the normative considerations, and will then analyze the substantive issues.
2. Altering the Treaty Obligations
A review of the bilateral extradition treaties between the United
States and other countries reveals that it is quite rare to find a strict provision obliging the states to extradite their citizens. Usually, United
States extradition treaties avoid such explicit language as adopted in the
United States-Israel extradition treaty, that "[a] requested Party shall not
decline to extradite a person sought because such person is a national of
the requested Party."33
Extradition treaties concluded between the United States and civil
law countries, which tend not to extradite their citizens, usually provide
that while the contracting parties are not bound to extradite their citizens,
the executive has discretionary power.34 This flexible arrangement leaves
32. See infra chapter IV B 3(b).

33. Convention on Extradition, supra note 5, at 1710.
34. Supplementary Convention to the Extradition Convention of 1909, Feb. 12, 1970,
U.S.-Fr., 22 U.S.T. 407 (Article III of the Convention amended Article V of the 1909 Convention). Article V of the 1909 Convention provided only that neither of the parties to the
Convention would be bound to deliver up its own citizens. This wording was interpreted by
the U.S. Supreme Court as prohibiting the extradition of citizens completely without leaving
any discretion to state authorities to extradite even if they were willing to do so. See Valentine
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the United States with the discretion either to reciprocate and not extradite its citizens to states that do not extradite their own citizens, or to
extradite its citizens even in cases where no reciprocity exists.
As opposed to the civil law approach, common law countries generally extradite their citizens. A review of the extradition treaties between
the United States and the United Kingdom,35 and between the United
States and Canada,36 reveals that these treaties are silent on the question
of extradition of citizens. Instead, these states extradite their citizens
when they deem it proper by means of their domestic legal organs.
It should be added that common law countries sometimes conclude
extradition treaties with the United States whereby the question of the
extradition of citizens is handled in a manner similar to extradition proceedings between the United States and civil law countries.37 In these
cases, the United States and its treaty partners are not bound to extradite
their citizens, but rather leave the decision whether or not to extradite to
the discretion of their respective domestic authorities. Accordingly, it is
evident that the provision in the United States-Israeli extradition treaty
imposing an affirmative duty on both states to extradite their citizens is
quite rare and extreme in United States extradition practice.
One might reach the same conclusion when considering Israel's
practice. Israel is a party to the 1957 European Convention on Extradition, according to which "[a] Contracting Party shall have the right to
refuse extradition of its nationals."3 However, Israel's discretion not to
extradite its nationals exists in its extradition practice not only when
dealing with civil law European states, but also in its extradition treaties
with both the United Kingdom3 9 and Canada. n° This survey reveals that a
more flexible agreement on the issue of extradition of nationals, i.e.,
leaving it to the discretion of the states rather than imposing an affirmative duty, would not be inconsistent with either the United States' or
v. U.S., 299 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1936). Belgium and the United States still have such an article
prohibiting extradition without discretion in their extradition treaty of 1901. See Treaty for
Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, Oct. 26, 1901, U.S.-BeIg., 32 Stat. 1894. For
other countries having a similar provision as the amended U.S.-France provision see the Convention on Extradition, Oct. 24, 1961, U.S.-Swed., 14 U.S.T. 1845, and the Convention on
Extradition, June 18, 1962, U.S.-Braz., 15 U.S.T. 2093.
35. See Treaty on Extradition, June 8, 1972, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 28 U.S.T.227.
36. A long series of extradition treaties have been replaced by the Treaty on Extradition,
Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T. 983, which entered into force March 22, 1976.
37. See Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 12, 1970, U.S.-N.Z., 22 U.S.T. 1;Treaty on Extradition, May 14, 1974, U.S.-Austl., 27 U.S.T. 957.
38. European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, 359 U.N.T.S. 271, 280 (Israel
acceded on Sept. 27, 1967).
39. See Agreement for the Reciprocal Extradition of Criminals, Apr. 4, 1960, Isr.-U.K.,
377 U.N.T.S. 331.
40. See Extradition Agreement, Mar. 10, 1967 Isr.-Can., 722 U.N.T.S. 262.
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Israel's practice of extraditing citizens, and would avoid the conflict
with Israel's Extradition Law that prohibits the extradition of citizens. It
would be premature to decide whether Israel and the United States
should modify their treaty obligations before analyzing the substantive
arguments regarding extradition in general, and extradition of citizens in
particular. Nevertheless, one can say that a change, if recommended,
would not contradict the general practice of either the United States or
Israel, since the strict prohibition on the extradition of citizens that appears in the current United States-Israel extradition treaty is rare.
3. Amending the Israeli Extradition Law
In order to conform Israel's international extradition obligation to
the United States with its domestic law prohibition on the extradition of
citizens, Israel could amend its law. Such an amendment could either
oblige Israel to always extradite its citizens, or could leave the issue to
the discretion of the Israeli authorities, enabling them to extradite citizens only to states that reciprocate by extraditing their own citizens to
Israel. In fact, however, the Israeli legislature has chosen to take a different approach. A recent amendment to the Israeli Extradition Law
provides that "[a] person who committed an extraditable offence according to this Extradition Law, and who is an Israeli citizen and
resident at the time his extradition is requested, will not be extradited
unless the following two conditions have been fulfilled:
1.

The extradition request is to stand for trial in the requesting
state.

2.

The requesting state undertakes to return the person extradited to Israel, to serve his 4sentence if he is convicted and
sentenced to imprisonment." '

This amendment is quite a natural result of the developing trend that
provides for the transfer of foreign convicts to their countries of citizenship to serve their prison sentences. Both Israel and the United States
joined the European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons,
concluded at Strasbourg on March 21, 1983,42 and both have enacted
laws to implement this treaty into their domestic legal systems 3 The
recent amendment to Israel's Extradition Law is inspired by the approach underlying these laws and treaty, but also differs from them.
41. Extradition Law (Amendment No. 6), 1999, S. H. 1708.
42. See Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, 35 U.S.T.
2867, 2870.
43. Israel enacted the Law Regarding the Transfer of Prisoners to their Own Countries,
1996, S. H. 1603. The United States enacted 18 U.S.C. § 4100 (Supp. 1997).
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The European treaty and the implementing laws refer to a foreigner,
present in the foreign state where he is being tried and sentenced to
prison. According to these legal instruments, such a person will be transferred to serve the prison sentence in his citizenship country only if the
individual, the sentencing country and the citizenship country all consent
to such a transfer. '
In the case of the amendment to the Israeli Extradition Law, the
Israeli offender is not present in the foreign country, but rather in his
citizenship country-Israel. The Israeli Extradition Law currently provides that his extradition to the foreign sentencing country obliges the
sentencing country and Israel to allow him to serve his sentence in Israel
if he desires. Only his consent plays a role in such a case, and neither
Israel nor the foreign state has any discretion in the matter. If the offender wishes to return to Israel to serve his sentence, he must be
allowed to do so."
If the United States were to amend its extradition treaty with Israel,
so as to enable the extradition of citizens only for the purpose of standing trial and commit itself to send the offenders back to Israel to serve
the punishment, the execution of the treaty would provide the consent of
both states to return extradited citizens to serve their punishment in their
own country. This article must now consider whether the United States
should adopt such a measure, and whether this is the ideal solution.
II. THE EXTRADITION OF CITIZENS FOR
TRIAL BUT NOT FOR SENTENCE

A. Is There a Legal Duty to Prosecute or Extradite?
Hugo Grotius wrote that "the state in which the culprit lives should,
on receiving the complaint, do one of two things either punish him itself
as he deserves or deliver him to judgment of the complainant." Grotius
speaks about this rule of "aut-dedere out punire" (to extradite or to punish), as part of customary international law.46
A survey of current authorities in public international law reveals
that the duty of a state to extradite or to prosecute and punish offenders
44. European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, supra note 42, at art. 3;
Israeli Law Regarding the Transfer of, Prisoners to Their Own Countries, supra note 43, at art.

3 & 4; U.S. Act to Implement the Treaties for the Transfer of Offenders § 18 U.S.C. 4100
(Supp. 1997).
45. See Extradition Law (Amendment No. 6), 1999, S. H. 1708; see also, supra text accompanying note 41.
46. HUGO GROTIUs, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 237 (Louise E. Loomis trans., Walter
J. Black, Inc. 1949) (1625).
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is not considered to be binding customary international law. The common view is that such an obligation exists only if two or more states
conclude a treaty providing for the same.
In the 18 h and 19 th Centuries, states actually did not follow a general
practice of extraditing offenders whom they did not prosecute. Thus, the
United States, for example, allowed anybody, whether a law-abiding
person or a fugitive, to enter its borders and remain. In terms of its immigration policy, the United States refused to deport any person even if
another state requested to try him. It was not until 1875 that the immigration policy changed to bar alien convicts from the United States, and
once inside, subject them to deportation or extradition procedures.48
France started an extradition practice as early as in the 188 h Century.
Britain and the United States followed only at the end of the 19 h Century. 49 Nevertheless, in the 0 h Century many states accepted the idea of
extradition by signing bilateral and multilateral treaties, imposing a duty
to extradite. Where these treaties recognize an exemption from the duty
to extradite, e.g., where the state has the discretion not to extradite its
nationals, the treaties usually impose a duty upon the state to prosecute
those exempted from extradition. °
Israeli law took a similar approach. In 1978, when the Extradition
Law was amended to prohibit the extradition of Israeli citizens,5' the Penal Law was also amended so as to provide for the competence to
prosecute Israeli citizens committing offences abroad.52 This amendment
2

47. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 475 introductory note at 557
(1986); Draft Convention on Extradition, supra note 1, at 41; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 950; HENKIN, supra note 4; GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW
AMONG NATIONS 221-222 (7th ed. 1996); GEOFF GILBERT, supra note 6, at 15; SHAW, supra
note 2, at 422; C. Shachor-Landau, Extra-territorialJurisdictionand Extradition 29 INT'L &
COMp. L. Q. 274, 275 (1980). One should bear in mind that this general rule against a duty to
extradite does not apply to international crimes, such as war crimes, grave breaches of the
Geneva Convention, and genocide to which universal jurisdiction exists, thus obliging a state
to prosecute or extradite the offender. A different category of crimes includes drug trafficking
and terror crimes such as aircraft hijacking and the taking of hostages. Treaties prohibiting
this second category of crimes contain provisions imposing a duty to prosecute or extradite.
These crimes, however, are not yet considered universal in the same way as the international
crimes mentioned above (war crimes, genocide, etc.). Thus, states that are not parties to the
conventions prohibiting these non-international crimes are not obliged to either prosecute or
extradite. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404, reporter's note I at
255-57; see also HENKIN, supra note 4.
48. See Draft Convention on Extradition, supra note 1, at 41-46
49. Id.
50. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 38, at §§ 6(1) & 6(2).
51. For a description of this process and the problem it created regarding Israel's international obligations towards the United States see supra text accompanying notes 25-32.
52. See Offences Committed Abroad (Amendment of Enactments) Law, 1978, 32 L.S.I.
63, (1976-79), Section 4A, then incorporated into the Penal Law 1977, L.S.I. Special Vol-
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also stated that if the Israeli citizen were convicted abroad, but escaped
to Israel before serving his sentence in part or in full, he would serve the
sentence in Israel. 3
Do the consistent statements by legal authorities that there is no
customary rule to prosecute or extradite 54 reflect the general practice at
the end of the millennium? Can democratic states, which form the majority of the states of the world, maintain a practice whereby they give
shelter to criminals escaping from foreign countries, without either extraditing them to the foreign state or prosecuting these criminals
themselves?
The practice proves to be the contrary. Most states sign extradition
treaties to avoid such a flight of criminals from justice. They take upon
themselves a duty to either return these persons to a state that possesses
jurisdiction over them, or when refusing to extradite, undertake to try
such fugitives themselves.
Although it would be an exaggeration to claim today that there currently exists a clear customary international legal duty to prosecute or
extradite, "several anti-terrorist conventions make this demand and academic writers are beginning to discern an obligation not to let the
individual remain unpunished. A new norm of international criminal law
may be developing."55
B. Prosecution or Extradition-WhichComes First?
1. Introducing the Problem
When Israel modified its domestic law to prevent the extradition of
its citizens to foreign countries (including the United States), it violated
its international obligation towards the United States as established by
the United States-Israel extradition treaty.56 This, of course, is unacceptable. A state should first amend its international obligations before it
enacts a law contradicting them. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind
that Israel, by amending its Extradition Law so as to prohibit the extradition of its citizens, did not intend to become a haven for Jewish
ume, Penal Law Section 7A, which was slightly changed in Amendment No. 39 to the Penal
Law of 1994, S.H. 1481.

53. Offences Committed Abroad (Amendment of Enactments) Law, 1978 32 L.S.I. 63,
Section 7A, then incorporated into the Penal Law, 1977, L.S.I. Special Volume, Section 10A,
which was slightly changed in Amendment No. 39 to the Penal Law, 1994, S.H. 1481, Section 10.
54. Supra, note 47.
55. GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 8 (1991).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 21-29.
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criminals, since it took upon itself a clear obligation to bring offenders to
justice in Israel. 7 In fact, Israel decided that with regard to its citizens
who committed offences abroad, priority should be given to the procedure of prosecution over the procedure of extradition. Why has the
United States insisted since 1978 that it will not accept such procedure?
Why has the United States rejected, as an alternative to the extradition of
Israeli citizens, the prospect of prosecuting them in Israel? Does this
mean that extradition is the preferable option?58
In order to answer these questions, one must consider two (possibly
competing) interests. First, one must gauge the public interest in bringing criminals to justice. Which jurisdiction can best achieve this? Is it in
the requested state where the accused is located, or in another state that
requests his extradition, i.e., generally the state where he allegedly
committed the crime? Thereafter, one must consider the interests of the
accused. In what forum will his interests best be protected-in the state
where he is found, or in the state requesting his extradition?
2. The Public Interest in Bringing Offenders to Justice
When considering the goals of criminal law and criminal justice
generally, it seems quite clear that they are best achieved where the offence occurred. The primary aim of criminal law is arguably retributive,
and a criminal who is morally guilty should be prosecuted and punished
to cause him pain commensurate with the harm caused by his offence.59
Society desires to harm the offender because of some harm he committed in the past.60 Such an interest in retribution will naturally exist in the
society that the criminal injured, the society of the state where he committed the crime. Retribution is a necessary, but not sufficient, objective
of criminal justice.6' One must add utilitarian or consequential goals such
as future deterrence of the criminal or others from committing the same
wrongful act,6 2 thus creating a degree of security in the community
where the offence was committed.63 Criminal justice also has educational
57. See 32 L.S.I 63. This provision became Section 4A of the Penal Law (Offences
Committed Abroad) (Consolidated Version) 1973 27 L.S.I. 32 (1970-1973). Today this pro-

vision appears with certain changes in Section 15 of the Israel Penal Law due to Amendment
No. 39 of the Israeli Penal Law, 1994, S. H. 1481.
58. See GILBERT, supra note 6, at 5, 13.
59. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 8-9 (1968).
60. Ruth Gavison, Punishment and Theories of Justice: Comments on Sadurski and Hoe
Kema, 25 ISR. L. REV. 351, 352 (1991).
61. Id.
62. See Antony Flew, Retrospect and Prospect, Retribution and Deterrence, 25 ISR. L.
REV. 376, 381 (1991); Miriam Gur-Arye, The Justification of Punishment: A Comment on
Retribution andDeterrence, 25 ISR. L. REV. 452, 453 (1991).
63. See Gavison, supra note 60, at 356.
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goals; it makes behavior reliable, and it teaches in advance what behavior is right or wrong. Sometimes. the threat of punishment may be
sufficiently effective as to make actual punishment unnecessary. 64 This
educational aspect of criminal law is also best achieved when applied in
the jurisdiction where the offence was committed.
Therefore, the propositions that "jurisdiction based upon nationality
is properly regarded as subsidiary to the territorial jurisdiction of the
state where the crime was committed, 65 and that the territorial principle
of jurisdiction is "everywhere regarded as of primary importance and of
fundamental character," 66 are strengthened significantly. The procedure
of extradition enables prosecution in the territory where the offence was
committed according to the preferred territorial principle. The criminal is
returned to the country that is chiefly interested in the discovery and
suppression of his crime.67
One should also not ignore one of the practical advantages of extradition, namely, the ease of collecting evidence. It is likely that
authorities can best collect evidence and adduce proof of guilt in the jurisdiction where the extraditable individual committed his offense. 68 If
the state declines to extradite the convict, and instead prosecutes him,
evidentiary difficulties are likely to arise. This problem is much more
complicated in common law legal systems than in civil law ones. Civil
law legal systems typically have quite flexible rules of evidence, thus
enabling a prosecutor to submit documentary evidence in a witness's
absence, without cross-examination. If a civil law state decides to try
him rather than extradite him, there is a higher probability that if he
committed a crime, he will be convicted.
Common law countries, as opposed to civil law ones, have strict
hearsay and cross-examination rules of evidence, which necessitates that
witnesses be present at the trial. However, witnesses cannot be forced to
come from abroad to testify, and voluntary testimony would likely prove
prohibitively expensive. The failure of a common law state to extradite
an offender to stand trial in the jurisdiction where he committed the
crime, suggests that there is a very low chance that he will be prosecuted
in a common law state to which he escaped.

64. See Flew, supra note 62, at 379.
65. Draft Convention on Jurisdictionwith Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J.
(Supp.1935).

INT'L

L. 433, 531

66. Id. at 485.
67. See Draft Convention on Extradition,supra note 1, at 38-39; see also G. V.

79 (1977).
68. See Draft Convention on Extradition,supra note 1, at 39, 128;
3, at 69, 122-123.

LA FOR-

EST, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM CANADA

SHEARER,

supra note
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As noted earlier, it would be optimal to try criminals in the jurisdiction where they committed their crimes. If an offender escapes, the
practice should be to extradite him to the jurisdiction where he committed the offence to stand trial. Nevertheless, some states have exceptions
to this general rule. For example, most civil law legal systems do not
extradite their own citizens. Since, however, they generally prosecute
using flexible rules of evidence, the goal of bringing offenders to justice
is not completely contravened.7 °
Israel is in general a common law legal system, particularly with regard to its laws of evidence.' When the Knesset prohibited the
extradition of Israeli citizens in 1978, it adopted this amendment with
only a partial adjustment to the civil law system. The Knesset provided
for jurisdiction over such nationals in Israel in the same way as in civil
law legal systems, but it did not amend the strict common law rules of
evidence, thus making the prosecution in Israel of Israeli citizens who
commit offences abroad virtually impossible.72
One might conclude that the best way to achieve the public interest
of bringing criminals to justice is to extradite them to the place where
the offence was committed. This rule is applicable to an extradition request concerning citizens of the requested state, or indeed, any other
person. It has additional importance when a state which implements
common law rules of evidence initiates the extradition request.
The priority of extradition as a means of achieving criminal justice
will not apply when a country other than where the offence was committed makes the extradition request. In such a case, the procedure of
extradition demonstrates no inherent advantage over that of prosecuting
the offender in the requested state. Nevertheless, states tend not to restrict extradition only to requesting states that have territorial
jurisdiction. Rather, in many instances when states conclude extradition

69. See GILBERT, supra note 6, at 175-176; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 319-320 (1998); M. CHEIRF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, 435 (1974).
70. See Theodor Meron, Non-Extradition of IsraeliNationals and ExtraterritorialJurisdiction: Reflections on Bill No. 1306, 13 ISR. L. REV. 215, 218-22 (1978); Judith Karp (First
Deputy to the Attorney General of Israel), Report Regarding the Extradition of Citizens § 4
(Dec. 6, 1981) (unpublished report, on file with author).
71. See Aharon Barak, The Tradition and Culture of the IsraeliLegal System in EUROPEAN LEGAL TRADITIONS AND ISRAEL, 473, 475-77, 479-82 (Alfredo Mordechai Rabello ed.,
1944); Karp, supra note 70, at § 3.
72. See Meron, supra note 70; Karp, supra note 70; see also the Opening Remarks by the
Minister of Justice for the Amendment of the Extradition Law Regarding on-Extradition of
Citizens, May 12, 1998, D.K. (1998) 7082.
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treaties, they permit extradition to any state asserting jurisdiction,
whether territorial or other.73
The new Israeli amendment speaks in general about extraditing
Israeli citizens to stand trial in a requesting state on the condition that
citizens are returned to Israel to serve their prison sentences. The
amendment does not limit such extradition only to a requesting state
where the offence was committed. This author believes that there may be
many situations in which a requesting state would provide a more appropriate forum to try a person, even if the offence was not committed in
its jurisdiction. For example, if the basis of jurisdiction is the victim's
nationality, some witnesses might be situated in the requesting state; or,
if the jurisdiction is based on the universal principle, some states may
have a special interest in trying a fugitive offender. For these reasons,
this article advocates that the new Israeli amendment is proper in its current form.
3. Protecting the Rights and Interests of the Offender
a) The Right to Stay in a Country
No person has an acknowledged legal right to stay in a country unless he is a citizen of that country. Only citizens possess an international
human right to enter their country, a component of which is the right to
stay there.74 Translating this right to the notion of extradition may lead
one to conclude that offenders fleeing from justice, if they are citizens of
73. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning Extradition, June 28, 1978, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 1(2), 32
U.S.T. 1487, 1488; Treaty on Extradition, Mar. 3, 1978, U.S.-Japan, art. I, VI(l), 31 U.S.T.
894, 897; Extradition Treaty, June 9, 1977, U.S.-Nor., art 1, 111(3), 31 U.S.T. 5621, 5623;
Treaty of Extradition, Jan. 13, 1961, U.S.-Braz., art. I, IV, U.S.T. 2094, 2098.
74. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 22(5), reprinted in
BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 504 (Ian Brownlie ed. 3rd ed., 1992); Fourth Protocol
to the European Convention on Human Rights, May 12, 1968, art. 3, reprinted in BASIC

347 (Ian Brownlie ed. 3rd ed., 1992); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 12(4), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 130 (Ian Brownlie ed. 3rd ed., 1992) (providing that "No one shall be arbiDOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

trarily deprived of the right to enter his own country") (emphasis added); Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 13(2), 29(2), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 24, 26 (Ian Brownlie ed. 3rd ed., 1992). But see MANFRED
NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 218-21 (1993) (commenting that
the right to enter and stay in the country is granted also to people who do not have a home

country and the center of their lives is in the state to which they wish to enter and stay even if
they are not its nationals). Others still insist that the term "his own country" mentioned in
Article 12(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra, refers only to
citizens. For a summary of the debate surrounding the proper interpretation of the phrase, see
HURST HANNUM, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND TO RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1987).

56-60
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the country to which they escaped, might not be extradited. Professor
S.Z. Feller, a distinguished Israeli criminal law scholar and author of a
comprehensive book on the law of extradition, believes that there is no
moral and political right to send a citizen from his land even if he is a
criminal, in the same manner that a state cannot deport its citizens regardless of their actions.75
Professor Feller's proposition reaches too far. A citizen's rights to
enter and stay in his country cannot be considered absolute, upon which
a state may impose no legitimate restrictions. The regional human rights
conventions such as the European Convention and the American Convention speak in fairly absolute terms about the right to stay in a
country,76 but the universal documents such as the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 77 leave room to limit the right to enter and stay in the country for
legitimate public interests. One of the interests justifying limitations on a
citizen's right to enter and stay in his country is crime suppression. If
this public interest is best achieved by extraditing the offender to the
country where the offence has occurred, 8 then it trumps a citizen's right
not to be forced to leave his own country.
b) The Protection of Basic Human Rights
Every offender deserves protection of his basic human rights, irrespective of where he is brought to justice. His life, dignity and physical
well being, as well as his right to a fair trial, must be observed. Prosecution or extradition should be prohibited if they would violate the
offender's basic human rights. Furthermore, neither a citizen of the requested country nor any other person should be extradited to a place
where his rights will be violated. This being so, the argument that a state
should not extradite its citizens because their rights may be violated in
the foreign requesting country is not acceptable. If the justice administered by other states is untrustworthy, then the requested state should
extradite neither its own citizens nor aliens. 79 The Restatement provides
75. S.Z. FELLER, THE LAW OF EXTRADITION 122 (1980); see also SHEARER, supra note
3, at 76 (stating that "[tihe deportation by a State of its own citizens is nowadays a rarity and
invoked only in times of severe internal disorders.").
76. See Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 74;
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 74. '
77. See Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 74;
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 74.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 56-73.
79. Charles de Visscher, Document from the League of Nations Committee of Experts for
the Progressive Codificationof InternationalLaw, Report on Extradition,20 AM. J. INT'L. L.
242, 244 (Supp. 1929).
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that, in general, states do not conclude extradition treaties with states
whose criminal justice system they mistrust. ° In such case, extradition of
citizens or any other persons is not possible.
When Israel amended its Extradition Law in 1978, prohibiting the
extradition of citizens, the main impetus was the fear that Jews would be
discriminated against, and would not obtain a fair trial outside Israel.8'
As noted above, this is a very weak rationale for a state to refuse to extradite its own citizens. If Israel lacks confidence in a foreign legal
system, it should not extradite any person there. This rationale for not
extraditing Israeli citizens seems especially odd when the requesting
state is the United States. Do the Israeli authorities really believe that an
Israeli citizen would be discriminated against by a United States court if
extradited there to stand trial? Will his fundamental human rights be
violated in the United States? The assumption is that Israel will refuse to
conclude any extradition treaty with a country that discriminates against
Jews.8" Accordingly, once Israel does conclude an extradition treaty with
a state, it cannot argue that its citizens should not be extradited there due
to fear of discrimination.
c) The Offender's Right to Be Tried and Punished
in His Natural Surroundings
Assuming that an extradited offender reaches a country where his
human rights are guaranteed, he may still feel himself a stranger if he is
not a citizen of that country. He might not be familiar with the language
and the manners of that state, or with its legal system. He might be alone
without his friends and family, and he might suffer from his isolation
from his natural surroundings.83 This is quite a strong argument against
extradition, but only with regard to people who are torn away from the
center of their lives to stand trial in a foreign county.
The difficulty a foreigner might face as a result of a trial conducted
in a foreign legal system in a foreign language can be reduced by mandating the use of a competent interpreter.84 While it is undoubtedly more
convenient to stand trial in one's home country, the interest of bringing
criminals to justice is probably best served by trying the offender in the
state of commission. While taking measures to reduce the harm to the
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 475 introductory note at 558
(1986).
81. D.K.(1979) 1452; D.K.(1981) 1032.
82. See Karp, supra note 70, at § 6.
83. See generally SHEARER, supra note 3, at 95-96, 118-27 (discussing disadvantages
faced by foreigners in foreign courts).
84. See Draft Convention on Extradition,supra note 1, at 129.
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offender during the trial process, that interest must prevail and the trial
must be held in the state of commission. One should bear in mind that
had the foreign offender not fled to his native country, he would have
stood trial in the foreign state of commission. If that is so, why should
over his
the offender who fled but was later caught enjoy any advantage
85
fellow offender who did not try to escape from justice?
Once the offender is convicted and sentenced to prison, his isolation
from his natural surroundings becomes more meaningful. To serve a
prison sentence in a foreign environment, away from friends and family,
without knowing the language of that country, seems to place an excessive burden on the convicted prisoner. If we believe that punishment has
rehabilitative as well as retributive and deterrent purposes, then serving
that punishment in a foreign state is problematic.
Sensitive to this problem, Shearer wrote as early as 1971:
A new approach is therefore suggested .... [Tihe extradition
ought to be limited to the trial and judgment only; that an extradited national, once he has been sentenced by a foreign court,
should be returned to his home state to serve the sentence imposed abroad but subject to the regulations-including those
relating to remission or reduction of sentence, parole and
probation-in force in his home state....

... The main purpose of the proposal is to secure to the most
appropriate forum jurisdiction over crime and at the same time
to secure to the most appropriate organs the task of corrective
punishment and rehabilitation. These latter6 organs, it is suggested, are those of the prisoners home state.1
Shearer's proposal was adopted by scholars87 and by the practice of
some states. The Netherlands has changed its extradition law in this
direction, providing in a 1988 amendment that nationals of the
Netherlands may be extradited if the requesting state undertakes to
return them to serve any prison sentence imposed upon them in the
Netherlands.88 Israel's recent amendment to its Extradition Law also
pursues this approach, allowing the extradition of a citizen to stand trial
85. See id.; see also SHEARER supra note 3, at 98.
86. See SHEARER, supra note 3, at 126-27.
87. See, e.g., Shachor-Landau, supra note 47, at 293; see also GILBERT, supra note 55, at

99.
88. See D.J.M.W. Paridaens, The Extradition of Nationals According to Dutch Law,
INT'L REV. PENAL L.

515 (1991).
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in the foreign requesting country only if the latter agrees to send the
extradited citizen back to Israel to serve any prison sentence. 89
C. Concluding Remarks-Redefining Extradition?
The United States should accept Israel's amendment to the Extradition Law, and change its extradition treaty with Israel so as to provide
that citizens will be extradited only to stand trial, and thereafter be sent
back to their country to serve a prison sentence. This arrangement strikes
a proper balance between the emerging international obligation not to let
offenders go unpunished, and the best interest of the public and the offender. It ensures that the offender will stand trial in the jurisdiction
where the offence was committed, which is the most proper forum to
prosecute criminals, but also does not isolate the convicted offender
from his social environment for a lengthy period. It enables him to serve
his prison sentence in his own country where he can best be rehabilitated.
Amending the United States extradition treaty with Israel so as only
to allow the extradition of citizens to stand trial while sending them back
to their own country to serve their prison sentence comports with the
current trend in international law to transfer foreign convicted prisoners
to serve their sentences in their own country. Israel and the United States
are both parties to the European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, and have enacted laws to implement its provisions. 90
Once Israel and the United States provide in their extradition treaty for
the transfer of a citizen to serve a prison sentence in his own country,
this will serve as both states' actual consent to allow such transfer
(without which the European Convention cannot be implemented).9"
An amendment of the United States international obligation with
Israel regarding this matter will demonstrate to the civil law countries
that the United States is ready to send citizens to serve their sentences in
their home country. This shift in attitude may create a movement among
the European states to change their Extradition Law arrangements with
the United States, thus permitting the extradition of citizens to stand to
trial in the United States. Once this happens, a major barrier to the creation of a universal extradition law will fall, promoting the international
suppression of crime, while protecting the rights and interests of extradited offenders to the greatest extent possible.

89. See supra note 41. In her 1981 Report, Judith Karp had already suggested to amend
the Israeli Extradition Law in this direction. See Karp, supra note 69, at § 10.
90. See supra notes 42, 43.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 44, 45.
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This whole process, starting with the general trend to transfer foreign prisoners to serve prison sentences in their own countries, and
advancing to the obligations states take upon themselves in extradition
treaties to extradite citizens solely for the purpose of standing trial, actually modifies the classical definition of extradition. When dealing with
the extradition of citizens, extradition no longer refers to the transfer of
offenders both to stand trial and to serve a prison sentence in a requesting state, but only to their transfer to stand trial.
The extradition of aliens who are citizens of a third, non-requesting
state, would also only be for the purpose of standing trial if the requesting state commits itself to transfer prisoners to serve their punishment in
their own country. If the extradited foreigner is a citizen of the requesting state, then one may characterize his extradition as serving both the
purpose of standing trial and for serving punishment. However, one
might argue that in such case, extradition is redefined as only for the
purpose of standing trial too. According to the new trend to transfer convicts to serve their custodial sentence in their own country, a foreigner,
whether extradited to stand trial in the requesting state or tried in the requested state, will still be transferred to serve his sentence in his country
of citizenship, which is in this case the requesting state. The issue of
transfer to serve a punishment becomes a separate matter, independent of
that of extradition. Extradition is confined only to the question of transfer to stand trial.

III. WHO

IS A CITIZEN FOR EXTRADITION PURPOSES

A. The Need for Effectiveness
The extradition of citizens is handled by states in three different
ways: some states will never extradite their citizens, others will always
extradite them, and there is an emerging trend followed by some states
(including Israel) to extradite citizens only for the purpose of standing
trial, while returning them to serve any prison sentences in their own
country. If a state adopts the practice of extraditing its citizens, then the
question of defining who is a citizen for extradition purposes is completely irrelevant. In such a case no difference exists between a citizen
and a foreigner. However, when a state either refuses to extradite citizens completely, or extradites them only on condition that they will
return to serve a custodial sentence, then the question of who is included
in the definition of a citizen becomes important.
As previously argued, the only justification for treating a citizen differently than a foreigner regarding extradition is the belief that he should
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not be isolated from his social environment. Thus, with the additional
objective of promoting the suppression of crime, the proper balance is to
send the offender to trial in the requesting state, but permit him to return
to his country to serve a sentence.
In reality, there are many instances in which persons are citizens of a
certain state but their contacts to that state are very weak. This may occur, for example, when a citizen of one state moves the center of his life
to another state without retaining contacts in his former state; states often do not annul emigrants' citizenship. Such persons may acquire a new
citizenship without losing the first one, even if they lack ties to the state
of their first citizenship. Ineffective citizenship may also exist when it is
attained automatically. If a state does not impose a residency requirement before being granted citizenship, then people may become citizens
without having actual contacts to the conferring state.
The law should ideally permit a citizen not to be extradited, or
should permit a citizen to be extradited to stand trial but not to serve a
sentence, only if that state of citizenship is the center of the offender's
life, and is actually the place where he has real contacts, e.g., where his
family and friends live or where he is employed. In practice, some persons may have more than one effective citizenship. In such a case, any
of the states of citizenship is permitted to protect such person and insist
that he should be returned to serve a custodial sentence imposed upon
him after extradition to a requesting state. This article shall now examine
whether the above mentioned requirement of effective citizenship as a
basis for any form of protection from extradition of citizens exists as a
matter of international law and United States and Israeli law.
B. Effectiveness in Real Law
1. International Law
Most extradition agreements are regulated by bilateral treaties.
When they make any reference to the issue of the extradition of citizens,
they do not define the term. Each state defines a citizen according to its
own law. 92 The European Convention on Extradition, which provides in
Article 6(a) that "[a] Contracting Party shall have the right to refuse extradition of its nationals" goes on to state in Article 6(b) that "[e]ach
Contracting Party may ...define as far as it is concerned the term

92. This is done with regard to extradition and with regard to any other issue involving a
citizenship requirement. International law is quite passive on the definition of citizenship in
general. See infra text accompanying notes 97, 98.
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'nationals' within the meaning of this Convention." 93 Article 6(b) actually makes a dual provision: first, that no requirements are imposed on
states by international law regarding the definition of citizens for the
purpose of their non-extradition, and second, that a state may establish a
special definition of the term 'national' when dealing with extradition.
The European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons has
adopted a similar approach. 94
The Restatement provides that, "[iun general, the definition of nationality for purposes of extradition is the same as for other purposes." 95
However, there are exceptions. Thus, for example, Sweden and Denmark include nationals of Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Norway, as
well as aliens domiciled in Sweden and Denmark, in the term 'nationals'
96
for the purpose of non-extradition.
In this stage of the development of international law, it is not surprising to find such a flexible approach towards the definition of
citizenship with regard to questions of extradition. International law
treats the whole issue of the definition of citizenship ambiguously. On
one hand, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights acknowledges
that every person has a right to nationality. 97 On the other hand, international law continues to consider the issue of citizenship as part of a
state's sovereignty and thus out of the reach of international regulation.98
If every state decides on its own who should be its citizens, and the
whole question of citizenship is beyond the reach of international law,
what is the meaning of the international right to nationality? This vagueness in international law regarding citizenship is very problematic when
applied to questions of extradition.
Reciprocity might not exist if each state were to define independently who are its citizens for the purpose of extradition. It is possible for
states to enlarge the definition of citizenship and thus significantly limit
93. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 38.
94. See Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, supra note 42. This Convention provides in Article 3(l)(a) that a sentenced person may be transferred under the

Convention only if that person is a national of the state requesting his transfer in order to
serve his sentence. The Convention goes on to provide in Article 3(4) that any state may define as far as it is concerned the term "national" for the purposes of the Convention.

95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 475 cmt. f. (1986).
96. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 956 n.2 (referring to 444
U.N.T.S. 348).

97. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, art. 15, supra note 74, at 24.
98. Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nation-

ality 1930 states that: "it is for each state to determine under its own laws who are its
nationals" 179 L.N.T.S. 89 (No. 4137), Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees Case (Fr. v.

Gr. Brit.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7). 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 3, at 851-853. P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 65-70 (1979).
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the whole scope of extradition. For this reason, international law should
move towards creating guidelines for states regarding the definition of
citizenship in extradition matters. These guidelines should be based on
the clear rationale for exempting citizens from a full or partial process of
extradition, namely, not to isolate them from their social environment.
Shearer wrote in 1971 that "[q]uestions of 'effective nationality' appear not to have been raised internationally in respect to the extradition
of dual nationals." 99 It seems that international law has not yet confronted the issue of effective nationality and extradition, either with
regard to dual nationals, or in any other context. The time is now ripe to
confront these issues.
2. United States Law
It is unsurprising that the United States domestic legal system lacks
a definition for the term "citizen" with respect to extradition. For many
years, the United States has engaged in a consistent practice of extraditing its citizens both for trial and for punishment.' °° Indeed, even in those
cases where extradition treaties contain a reservation whereby the United
States preserves its discretion not to extradite its citizens, in practice it
usually does extradite citizens, even where the receiving states do not
reciprocate and will not extradite their own citizens to the United
States. '°'
Now that the United States has become a party to the European
Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, and to other treaties
providing for the transfer of offenders to serve their prison sentence in
the country of their citizenship, 0 2 and has enacted a federal law to implement such treaties, it becomes important to define the term "citizen"
for this purpose. Will the United States agree to transfer any citizen prisoner to a foreign state, or only such persons who will be transferred to
their effective citizenship country? Will the United States request the
transfer of all United States citizens, or only those whose center of life is
in the United States? If the United States adopts a practice whereby it
will extradite its citizens only to stand trial, it will have to address the
above mentioned issue of whom to request back to the United States-

99. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 131; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 475 cmt. f. (1986) (providing that "Dual nationals are usually considered nationals of
the requested state, even if their other nationality is that of the requesting state"). This proves
that no attention is being given to the effectiveness of nationality.
100. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 475.
101. See, e.g., Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
102. See Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, supra note 42.
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any citizen, or only those who have effective contacts to the United
States.
3. Israeli Law
a) The 1978 Amendment to the Extradition Law
The 1978 amendment to the Israeli Extradition Law provided that
"[a]n Israeli national shall not be extradited save for an offence committed before he became an Israeli national".
The legislature actually did not define who is an Israeli citizen for
purposes of non-extradition. When deciding to amend the law to prohibit
the extradition of citizens however, the Israeli legislature was aware of
the fear that Israel would become a haven for Jewish criminals.' °4 The
Israeli law of nationality enables any Jew who immigrates to Israel to
become an Israeli citizen almost automatically.' 5 Israel feared that Jews
from all over the world who commit crimes would flee to Israel, and
then seek shelter from extradition on the grounds of their Israeli citizenship.' 06 Israel honestly intended to avoid becoming such a haven for
criminals, and sought to create a legal arrangement whereby only a person who was an Israeli citizen at the time of the commission of the
offence would be protected from extradition. In fact, however, the law
was inadequately drafted to achieve this goal. First, Jews could enter
Israel, very easily become citizens, commit a crime abroad, and then flee
to Israel (from which, according to the law, they could not be extradited).' O7 Second, many Jews who held Israeli citizenship without having
any actual contacts to Israel knew that if they committed a crime and
then fled to Israel, they could not be extradited.
b) The Sheinbein Case
Samuel Sheinbein was born in the United States on July 25, 1980. In
October 1997, an indictment was filed against him in the Circuit Court
of Montgomery District in Maryland for first degree murder and
conspiracy to commit first degree murder, but he had escaped to Israel in
103. Offences Committed Abroad (Amendment of Enactments) 1978, 32 L.S.I. 63
(1976-1979). This amendment eventually became Section IA of the Israeli Extradition Law.
See supra text accompanying note 28.
104. See D. K. (1977) 553.
105. See Nationality Law § 2, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 50, (1951-52).
106. See D. K. (1977) 553.
107. Offences Committed Abroad (Amendment of Enactments) 1978, 32 L.S.I. 63
(1976-1979). This amendment eventually became Section IA of the Israeli Extradition Law.
See supra text accompanying note 28.
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September. The United States requested his extradition, and the Israeli
Minister of Justice asked the District Court of Jerusalem to decide
whether he should be extradited according to Israeli law.
Samuel Sheinbein is a United States citizen, and spent all his life
there. His native language is English, his family lives in the United
States and he was educated there. However, Samuel Sheinbein is also an
Israeli citizen. His grandparents immigrated to Israel in the 1930s, and
his father was born there in 1944. The state of Israel was established in
1948, and according to the 1952 Israeli Nationality Law, his grandmother and his father were granted Israeli citizenship. The state of Israel
argued before the Israeli District Court that Israeli citizenship had not
been legally granted to Samuel Sheinbein's grandmother and father. The
District Court rejected this argument, and stated that both the grandmother and the father were Israeli citizens.' ° The Supreme Court
affirmed that statement. 9 According to the Israeli Nationality Law, a
child born outside of Israel to an Israeli citizen automatically becomes a
citizen of Israel." ° Thus, Samuel Sheinbein, born in the United States to
an Israeli citizen, became an Israeli citizen and enjoyed dual nationality.
The District Court that decided on Sheinbein's extradition had to
base its decision on the 1978 amendment to the Extradition Law. According to the plain language of the statute, Israel could not extradite
Sheinbein since he committed the offence while holding Israeli citizenship. However, the District Court felt that a decision not to extradite
Sheinbein would be unjust. The court pointed to the conflict between
Israel's international obligation vis-A-vis the United States to extradite
any person including its citizens, and its domestic law prohibition
against the extradition of its citizens. In the court's opinion, Israeli jurisprudence required that where a conflict existed between international
law and domestic law, the court should interpret domestic law so as to
avoid the conflict."' For this reason, the court decided to define the term
"national" which appears in the Extradition Law narrowly. According to
the court, it would only include such citizens for the purpose of nonextradition whose center of life was in Israel, i.e., whose citizenship was
effective. According to the District Court, persons holding Israeli citizenship who did not live in Israel, and whose center of life was
108. See C.A. (Jm.) 1545/97. The Attorney General v. Ploni (forthcoming opinion on
file with author) § 97-110.
109. See C.A. 6182/98 Shinebein v. The Attorney General (Feb. 2, 1999) (forthcoming
opinion on file with author) dissenting opinion of President Barak para. 1-8, majority opinion
of Justice Or, para. 1.
110. See Nationality Law § 4, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 50, (1951-52).
111. See Ploni, para. 112-14.
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elsewhere, would not be granted the protection of non-extradition."'
With regard to Sheinbein, the District Court decided that his Israeli citizenship was not effective, and accordingly could not prevent his
extradition from Israel. The court added that since the United Stateswhere he had committed the crime and which was requesting his extradition-was the center of his life providing him with its citizenship,
there was no reason to prevent his extradition as requested." 3 Sheinbein
appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court. In a 3-2 decision, the Supreme
Court overruled the District Court, and decided not to extradite Sheinbein.
President Barak, who wrote the primary dissenting opinion," 4 agreed
with the District Court's view that the term "national" appearing in the
Extradition Law should receive a special, narrow interpretation. "' He
also agreed with the need to avoid the conflict between the international
obligation and the domestic law by interpreting the statute narrowly to
include only effective citizenship." 6 He went still further to explain such
interpretation not only to reconcile international and domestic law, but
also based on the rationale for the non-extradition of citizens. President
Barak explained that the main justification for non-extradition of citizens
is the desire to bring them to justice in their natural surroundings. If a
citizen such as Sheinbein does not live in Israel, and Israel is not the
center of his life, then there is no reason to prevent his extradition from
Israel, especially if the requesting country, where he committed the
crime, is the center of his life."'.
The majority opinion was led by Justice Or,"8 who actually agreed
that ideally, the law should be as the District Court and President Barak
argued. However, he believed that such an outcome could not be reached
by an expansive interpretation of the language of the 1978 amendment to
the Extradition Law. He argued that the statute clearly and explicitly
provided for the non-extradition of citizens without limiting the statute
to those who possessed effective citizenship." 9 Justice Or also examined
the legislative history of the extradition provisions, inferring that the
legislature intended to exempt any citizen from extradition, whether or

112. See Ploni, para. 113, 115-24.
113. See Ploni para. 118, 125.
114. See Shinebein, dissenting opinion of President Barak. Judge Kedmi joined President Barak's opinion and added a few remarks in a separate dissent.
115. See Shinebein, dissenting opinion of President Barak para. 19-22.
116. See Shinebein, dissenting opinion of President Barak para. 17.
117. See Shinebein, dissenting opinion of President Barak para. 14.
118. With whom Justice Ilan and Justice Mazza concurred.
119. See Shinebein, majority opinion para. 19.
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not residing in Israel. 20 According to the majority opinion, in order to
effect the ideal solution (under which non-extradition of citizens would
apply only to those persons whose center of life was in Israel), the
Knesset had to amend the Extradition Law.' The majority decided that
in the meantime, under the22prevailing law, Sheinbein could not be extradited to the United States.
c) The 1999 Amendment to the Extradition Law
A decision at first instance in the Sheinbein case was still pending
when the Knesset published a proposal to
amend the Extradition Law
23
with respect to the extradition of citizens.
The proposed amendment provided that:
1.

Israeli citizens will only be extradited to stand trial on condition that they will be sent back to Israel to serve a prison
sentence, if they so wish.

2.

This privilege will only be granted to citizens who are also
residents of Israel.

3.

In order to be granted this privilege, a person must be a citizen and a resident of the state of Israel at the time he
committed the offence.

This amendment, in modified form, became law after the Supreme
Court delivered its ruling not to extradite Sheinbein. 2 4 The final statutory provision followed the first two elements of the proposal, but not
the third. It provides that in order for an extradited offender to be
granted the right to return to Israel to serve his prison sentence, he is required to have been
an Israeli citizen and resident when the extradition
125
request was made, and not when the offence was committed.
This modification actually shifts the balance towards the interests of
the individual, at the expense of the public interest in suppressing crime
through the process of extradition. According to the new law, a person
120. See Shinebein, majority opinion para. 10-13.
121. See Shinebein, majority opinion para. 4-9.
122. See Shinebein, majority opinion para. 22. See also Shinebein, concurring opinion of
Judge Ilan. Justice Mazza did not write a separate opinion.
123. The District Court gave its decision on the Shinebein case on September 6, 1998
while the proposed amendment was on March 23, 1998. See Draft Bill amending the Extradition Law, 1998, H. H. 2707.
124. The Court gave its decision on February 2, 1999. The amendment to the Extradition
Law was passed on April 19, 1999. See Extradition Law (Amendment No. 6), 1999, S. H.
1708.

125. See Extradition Law (Amendment No. 6), 1999, S. H. 1708; see also supra text accompanying note 41.
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may be a foreigner as a matter of Israeli law when committing the crime
and still obtain the above-mentioned protection, under which he returns
to serve his sentence in Israel. He may commit a crime, flee to Israel,
become an Israeli citizen and then seek protection.
This outcome could be avoided were the courts to require a considerable residence period, e.g., at least five consecutive years, before
someone could be entitled to the protection of returning to Israel to serve
a custodial sentence. In such a case, it would be evident that Israel is the
center of such a person's life. The rationale of a convict serving a prison
sentence in his own social environment could justify his return to Israel
to serve his sentence. If the residence requirements were interpreted in
this way, one might assume that a criminal who commits an offence outside Israel, when not yet an Israeli citizen, and thereafter flees Israel, will
be apprehended and his extradition requested before he meets the residence requirement. In such a case, even if the fugitive has already
become an Israeli citizen, he would be extradited without the right to
return to serve his sentence, since he had not been resident in Israel for
the considerable period of at least five years.
C. Conclusion-Reconsideringthe Definition of Citizenship
International law fails to define who is a citizen in the context of extradition, whether in bilateral or multilateral extradition treaties. This is
unsurprising given the universal policy of respecting a state's autonomy
to determine the identity of its citizens. United States law does not define who is a citizen when dealing with extradition matters, since the
United States consistently extradites persons whether or not they are
citizens.
Israel began avoiding the extradition of its citizens in 1978, which
forced the state to reconsider who should be granted a citizen's protection against extradition. The Sheinbein case highlighted the
circumstance of a citizen who is not resident in Israel for a considerable
period of time before the extradition request is made, and who does not
have his main contacts in Israel, such as family ties, friends, and work.
Such a person is not an effective citizen of Israel and should not be
granted any protection from extradition, even if he holds Israeli citizenship. The Sheinbein court could not follow this rationale due to
contravening statutory provisions. However, the legislature considered
both the extradition and citizenship issues when it reviewed the Extradition Law after the Sheinbein judgment. Following the 1999 amendment
to the Extradition Law, an Israeli citizen must also be a resident of Israel
to derive any form of protection regarding an extradition. A citizen who
is not an effective citizen of Israel will not be protected.
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This is the correct outcome. It serves the rationale of protecting citizens against the extradition: namely, that they should be tried and
punished in their natural surroundings. Accordingly, international law
should adopt a similar definition of citizenship for extradition matters,
one that will influence domestic legal systems and provide an ideal legal
model.

IV. FINAL REMARKS
The very recent Israeli amendment to its Extradition Law regarding
the extradition of citizens strikes a proper balance between the rights of
the citizen to serve a punishment in his natural surroundings, and the
public interest in bringing criminals to justice in the most appropriate
forum. This amendment softened the Israeli prohibition on extradition of
citizens, but it still stands in conflict with the United States-Israeli extradition treaty's provision obliging the states to extradite their citizens
without exception. The United States and Israel should modify their
agreement to reflect the adoption of the new Israeli provision.
The new Israeli law follows recent trends in the definitions of both
extradition and citizenship, stating that citizens will be extradited solely
for the purpose of standing trial, and will be sent back to the requested
state to serve their prison sentence. Extradition of both citizens and
aliens is now becoming a process whereby states extradite fugitive offenders only to stand trial, since international law and prevailing state
practice provide that service of prison punishment should be in the
country of citizenship, regardless of where the offender was tried.
The Israeli law also provides that only Israeli citizens who are also
resident in Israel will be returned to serve their punishment there. Since
the rationale for the return of citizens to serve a prison sentence in their
own county is based on the need to rehabilitate them in their social environment, the standard in the context of extradition should always be
effective citizenship. Only those citizens who actually reside in a state
for a considerable period before extradition should benefit from the
privilege of serving their prison sentence in their country of citizenship.

